Asymmetry‐lite? The Constitutional Status of the “Terms of Union” for British Columbia,
















rights on  the  signatory governments – obligations and  rights which may not exist  for other provinces. 
The  function  of  these  Terms  of  Union  agreements  is  described  and  analyzed  by  comparing  the  case 












formed  after  the  “Confederation”  of  Ontario,  Quebec,  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick.  The 
three Prairie Provinces and the three Northern territories came about as a result of Acts of the 
central  government  in  Ottawa.  And  three  provinces  joined  as  a  result  of  unique  agreements 





importance  in  the  many  decades  since  they  were  signed  and  put  into  effect.  However  they 
occasionally generate controversy or at  least are  recognized as  important pieces of  the  larger 
puzzle that is the sweeping set of Acts, documents, accords, and conventions that comprise the 
Canadian constitution. On one hand, Terms of Union may be viewed as a pact or even treaty‐
like mechanism between  two otherwise “sovereign” entities. On  the other hand  they may be 
viewed  as  mere  “laundry  lists”  of  time‐specific  requirements  for  the  dominions  to  become 
provinces. 
The truth is somewhere in between the two. This paper attempts to develop a theory of 
the  evolution  of  the  Terms  of  Union  for  Prince  Edward  Island,  British  Columbia,  and 









education  in  Newfoundland  and  Labrador  as  instances  of  when  Terms  of  Union  became 
prominent constitutional mechanisms which guided not only policy development but the overall 
behaviour of federal and provincial governments. In addition, the paper adds to the discussion 
of  the  constitutional  significance  of  Terms  of  Union  by  assessing  their  impacts  on  the 






other political battles.  Former British Columbia  Senator Pat Carney  caused  controversy  in  the 
1990s when  she  suggested  that one way  for British Columbia  to get  the most  from Canadian 
federalism would be to renegotiate the Terms of Union between that province and the federal 
government.1 It  highlighted  a  somewhat  consistent  view  that  exists  in  British  Columbia  and 
elsewhere that Terms of Union between provinces and the federal government are relevant and 
evolving  constitutional  agreements.  The  view  highlights  a  widespread  interpretation  of  the 
Terms  as  having  a  contractual  nature.  That  they  are  potentially  open  for  renegotiation  and 







Service  for  the conveyance of mails and passengers,  to be established and maintained 
between the Island and the mainland of the Dominion, Winter and Summer, thus placing 







the  steam  service  referred  to  in  this  Schedule.”3 It  is  noteworthy  that  the  legislative  and 
statutory  process  was  not  the  main  or  only  approach  used.  The  Terms  of  Union  were  not 














a  comprehensive  theory  of  Canada’s  Terms  of  Union  agreements  within  the  context  of  the 
Canadian constitution and Canadian federalism. They were chosen because they both represent 




constitutional  status  in  the  1870s  and  1880s.  The  federal  government was  slow  to  act  on  its 
codified promise to build a railroad linking the province with the rest of the country. The second 








1860s  and  1870s,  many  settlers  supported  the  direct  tutelage  of  Queen  Victoria  and  the 
imperial  government  in  London. But  increasingly  it was  felt  that  the  colony  should have  local 
representative  institutions  by  way  of  responsible  government  and  membership  in  (or 




Yet  even  the most  ardent  supporters  of  Confederation  in  the  colony  identified  British 





Carrall,  and  John Helmcken) drew up Terms of Union which were  closely  emulated by Prince 
Edward Island two years later when that province joined Confederation in 1873.7 














The  British  Columbian  Terms  of  Union  detail  a  number  of  conditions  for  entry  into 
Confederation  including services to be taken up by and run by the federal government. These 
are  largely  uncontroversial  conditions  which  in  any  event  are  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal 
government  throughout Canada  as  outlined  in  Section 91 of  Constitution Act,  1867  (formerly 
the British North America Act). These include funding for a national postal service, the military, 
penitentiaries,  the  “trusteeship  and  management”  of  Aboriginal  lands  and  relations  with 
Aboriginals, and other  functions.8 In  this  respect,  the Terms of Union of British Columbia  (but 
also Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland & Labrador) are not fundamentally interesting to 
study given that they merely repeat obligations already stated in the Constitution. 
However,  three of the most  important terms were: the availability of sufficient  federal 








Minister  Alexander  Mackenzie  effectively  ignored  British  Columbia’s  terms  and  subsequent 
protests over the course of his government from 1873 to 1878. In response to British Columbian 
protests,  but  also  as  a  result  of  the  National  Policy  of  opening  up  the  west  and  economic 
protectionism,  McDonald  was  returned  to  power  in  1878  and  quickly  initiated  work  on  the 
railroad.11 




of  the  country  as  a  result  of  being  an  “awkward  partner”12 in  terms  of  federalist  issues, 
separated geographically by the Rocky Mountains, and culturally distinct as “Lotusland” or the 
“Left  Coast.”13  But  the  resultant  confrontation  over  Ottawa’s  failure  to  quickly  meet  the 
demands  expressed  in  the  Terms  of  Union  became  so  bitter  that  by  1876  the  provincial 
government threatened secession if the federal government continued to stagnate on fulfilling 
Term 11.14 According to  John Munro,  the young province  likely would have succeeded to that 


















frame would mean  that  “the  deal was  off.”16 Eastern  Canadian  newspapers,  surprised  at  the 





through  a  contractual  lens.  Clearly  the  federal  government  in  this  otherwise  highly  centralist 
period  in  Canadian  history 18 did  not  feel  quite  the  same  way.  The  Terms  were  viewed  by 
McDonald,  but  especially  by Mackenzie,  as  a  political  to‐do  list.  As  such,  even  though many 
supporters of  the federal government  in this crisis were keen on British Columbia’s entry  into 
confederation they did not view the Terms of that province’s entry as constitutionally, legally or 
politically  binding.  Nevertheless,  the  Terms  provided  a  useful  bargaining  chip  as  the  rallying 
point  for  secessionist  sentiment  when  the  federal  government  reneged  on  the  promises  to 
which  it  had  formally  agreed.  Similar  rhetoric  existed  over  a  century  later  in  former  Senator 
Carney’s  shocked  reaction  to  the  federal  government’s  policy  of  de‐staffing  many  British 
Columbian lighthouses.19 The jurisdiction for lighthouses is ascribed to the federal government 
in  Section  91  of  the  Constitution,20 but  Carney  and  others  felt  that  the  federal  government’s 
moves were particularly brazen because it was also seen as breeching the spirit of provisions in 
Term  5,  Section  G  of  the  Terms  of  Union  (which  also  compelled  the  federal  government  to 
assume the costs of operating and maintaining British Columbia’s lighthouses). 
  Terms  of  Union  guide  the  behaviour  of  both  levels  of  government  in  those  provinces 
where they exist. Provinces that do not have Terms of Union may seek other avenues to redress 




























the  federal  government.  Terms  of  Union may  also  have  the  effect  of  constraining  provincial 
action. In this sense, Terms agreed upon by both federal and provincial levels of government are 
not used  just  to attain benefits or  subsidies  from  the  federal  government but  to protect pre‐
existing provincial  rights  or  institutions  from any potential  federal  (or  provincial)  intrusion.  In 
the  case  of  reform  to  Newfoundland  and  Labrador’s  denominational  education  system,  the 
Terms  of  Union  (as  with  any  other  part  of  the  Constitution)  provided  something  of  a 
constitutional  constraint  on  that  province’s  policy  agenda. 21  Like  the  rest  of  Canadian 
Constitution  then,  Terms  of  Union  are  rigid  constitutional  mechanisms  that  entrench  rights, 
responsibilities and rules of behaviour of both orders of government. 
  Newfoundland  and  Labrador was  the  last  province  to  join  Confederation  in  1949  as  a 
result of a very close  referendum. Religious or “denominational” education  rights had existed 
there  since  the  1860s.22 Such  rights  are  cited  in  many  areas  of  the  Canadian  constitution. 
Education  is  under  provincial  jurisdiction  as  outlined  by  Section  92,  and  protection  of 
denominational  education  is  outline  in  Section  93. 23  But,  when  the  province  joined 
Confederation  in  1949,  that  section  of  the  constitution  did  not  make  the  sorts  of  specific 
guarantees  for  public  funds  on  a  non‐discriminatory  basis  to  denominational  schools  that 
eventually  made  its  way  in  to  Term  17  of  Newfoundland’s  Terms  of  Union. 24  As  such, 
Newfoundland’s  Terms  of Union, which  Kennedy  notes  is  longer  and  goes  into  greater  detail 
than that of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island,25 specifically defined the ways in which 
denominational  education  rights,  normally  defined  under  Section  93,  would  come  about  in 
Newfoundland  and  Labrador.  Indeed,  the  Terms  of  Union  agreement  specifically  stated  that 
Term 17  effectively  replaces  Section 93 or  acts  in  lieu  of  it.  In  this way,  Terms of Union may 
modify  the  application  of  provisions  in  the  Constitution  Acts  for  specific  provinces.  For  new 
provinces,  Terms may also  then be  seen as opportunities  for negotiating  specific  applications 
and functions for constitutional provisions provided for elsewhere in the constitution. 
  This was evinced when the provincial Liberal governments of Clyde Wells and later Brian 
Tobin  initiated a number of  reforms  in the education system over the course of  the 1990s.  In 
1992,  the Royal  Commission of  Inquiry  into  the Delivery of  Programs and  Services  in  Primary, 









23  Ronald  Penney,  “The  Constitutional  Status  of  Denominational  Education  in  Newfoundland”  in  The  Vexed 
Question: Denominational Education in a Secular Age Ed. William McKim (St. John’s: Breakwater, 1988), 80‐82; also, 









possible  changes  needed  to  be  made  to  Newfoundland  and  Labrador’s  denominational 
education system. The impetus for the change was the high cost of educational service delivery 
of  so  many  school  systems,  the  poorer  quality  of  education  in  the  province  as  a  result  of 
separate  school  systems, and  the  impact  that  such a  system has on  the  rights of parents and 
students.26 As a result of the Inquiry, the Liberal Government held a referendum in 1995 where 
a slim majority of voters supported the provincial government’s efforts to reform schools and 




and  the  provincial  government  implemented  a  sweeping  amalgamation  of  the  public  school 
system. 
Reforming  the  school  system was not possible  through  simply  implementing  statutory 
changes.  Of  course,  given  that  denominational  education  was  a  constitutional  right,  the 
constitution had to be amended in some way. Section 93 applies to denominational education, 
but in the circumstance of Newfoundland and Labrador, Term 17 effectively replaced or altered 










The  British  Columbia  case  study  shows  that  the  Terms  are  important  constitutional 
documents and may act as  contract or  treaty‐like  structures which govern  federal—provincial 
relations.  The  case  of  Newfoundland  and  Labrador  shows  that  Terms  of  Union  may  restrict 
legislative agendas  in provinces  if  the provisions contained within  the Terms seek  to  limit  the 
legislative independence of either level of government (in this case, provincial governments). 
  What do these two cases tell us about a possible theory of the roles of Terms of Union in 
constitutional  contexts? While  Terms  of  Union  are  typically  relegated  to  being  nothing more 














than  conditions  for  the  entry  into  Canada  of  the  three  provinces  where  they  exist  (and 
potentially  future  provinces),  they  are  clearly  more  than  that.  They  are  relevant  in 
contemporary contexts. The salience of the Terms in Prince Edward Island when the fixed link 
was  constructed  a  decade  ago,  the  denominational  education  issue  in  Newfoundland  and 




















  To  better  understand  this  issue,  it  may  be  useful  to  look  at  the  development  of  the 
Terms of Union as an issue in Canadian federalism. Kennedy, writing in 1950, suggested that the 
general  compact  theory  had  no  basis  in  “law  or  in  fact”  and  that  it  was  used  mainly  by 
opportunistic politicians.35 He did contend however that British Columbia, Prince Edward Island 
and Newfoundland & Labrador hold positions within Canadian confederation  that are distinct 
from  the  seven  other  provinces,  and  that  Newfoundland  &  Labrador  in  particular  had  a 
relationship with the federal government that was especially different from the other provinces 
given that it joined after the Statute of Westminster of 1931. 
















have  total  control  over  its  own  sovereignty.  Not  only  had  the  Constitution  not  yet  been 
patriated,  but  the  Statute  of  Westminster  which  effectively  equalized  the  status  of 
Commonwealth members with that of Britain under a common Crown was itself in the distant 
future.  Therefore,  British  Columbia’s  and  Prince  Edward  Island’s  very  existence  in  Canadian 
confederation was for much of Canada’s history codified through British orders‐in‐council.36 As 
a  result  of  this,  the  argument  has  been made  in  both  provinces  that  the  rules  governing  the 
relationships  of  Victoria  and  Charlottetown with Ottawa  are  a  result  of  unique  constitutional 
loopholes  that  –  until  1982  –  were  ultimately  governable  by  and  accountable  to  the  British 
Crown.   
  For  a  variety  of  reasons  however,  this  does  not  lend  weight  to  the  general  compact 
theory  with  which  some  have  argued  that  Terms  of  Union  are  fundamentally  treaties  or 
contracts.  First,  the  Terms of Union  for  each of  the  three provinces which have  them are,  in 
substance,  not  treaty‐like  in  nature.    Each of  the  three  Terms of Union  in  Canada  all  contain 
similar clauses which state that the Terms “shall have the force of law notwithstanding anything 
in  the  Constitution  Acts,  1867”  and  1982.  With  the  exception  of  transitional  subsidies,  and 
various  Terms  that  –  as  discussed  above  –  modify  the  application  of  already  existing 
constitutional  rights  or  responsibilities,  there  is  nothing  in  the  Terms  that  either  trump 
something elsewhere in the constitution or add new constitutional rights and/or responsibilities 
that  do  not  (or  can  not)  theoretically  exist  for  other  provinces.  The  general  picture  then 










of  ‘treaty’  obligations,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  any  other  remedy  arises—certainly  not  a  right  to 
withdraw,  or  justification  for  withdrawing,  from  federation.”38 The  failure  of  any  of  these 
agreements to adequately or formally deal with breaches of them by either partner government 
is evidence that they do not comprise contract‐like legal or constitutional entities. 
Despite  this overwhelming evidence that  the substance of  these Terms do not suggest 
treaty‐like  obligations  between  the  provinces  and  the  federal  government  (or  an  especially 
distinct  status  for  the  signatory  provinces)  the  Terms  do  provide  unique  constitutional 
opportunities  for  the  provinces  that  have  them.  Their  very  existence  for  some provinces  and 
absence  in  others  conforms  to  the  textbook  definition  of  asymmetrical  federalism.  Douglas 








Brown notes  that  federal asymmetry  is  the condition where  the “entities becoming united or 
being governed by a federal or central government are treated… unequally or non‐identically.”39 
As such, and given that the sub‐national units of Canada constitutionally came about as a result 







religious  education  rights  in  Newfoundland  and  Labrador  (and  also  in  Ontario,  Quebec  and 
elsewhere),  and  the  “transportation  guarantees  in  the  terms  of  union  for  British  Columbia, 
Prince  Edward  Island  and  Newfoundland,”  are  among  the  most  significant  examples  of 
constitutionally  entrenched  asymmetrical  federalism  in  Canada.40 Both  of  these  examples  – 
which constitute the cases studied here – are indeed examples of ways in which Terms of Union 
have produced unequal or non‐identical pressures on Canadian federalism. 
But whether  or  not  these  cases  exemplify  asymmetrical  federalism depends  on which 
definition  of  asymmetrical  federalism  we  use.  For  instance,  Brown  highlights  such  things  as 
Quebec having civil rather than common law as evidence of asymmetry, which, indeed it is. But 
Gordon Gibson notes that such examples, and likely the examples Brown provides regarding the 




In  both  cases  presented  here,  the  Terms  of  Union  appear  to  provide  non‐identical 
opportunities to provinces. However, they also appear to conform more to Gibson’s definition 
of  symmetry.  For  instance,  the  transitional  subsidies  contained  in  the  Terms  of  Union  for  all 
three  provinces where  they  exist were meant  to  bring  these  provinces  in  line with  Canadian 





provinces.  Finally,  denominational  education  rights,  while  they  were  unique  in  the  case  of 














for  denominational  schools.42 The  Constitution  then  can  be  seen  as  allowing  for  optional 
asymmetry  in  this particular  issue area. The only difference  in  the case of Newfoundland and 










a  litany of promises,  conditions,  and  subsidies  that do not  apply  to other provinces. Many of 
these  are  time‐specific,  and  are  meant  only  for  the  brief  transition  period  after  joining  the 
Canadian family. 
Finally,  while  many  of  the  Terms  of  Union  either  repeat  or  adjust  the  constitutional 
rights and responsibilities of both tiers of government that are already codified elsewhere in the 
constitution,  in  practice  they  also  have  the  effect  of  creating  a  limited  degree  of  federal 
asymmetry. This asymmetry‐lite  is a  feature of Terms of Union that should be  further studied 
and analyzed. Comparing the abovementioned cases with others in the three provinces can help 
stimulate new theoretical perspectives on the roles of Terms of Union as tenets of the Canadian 
Constitution.  Examining  court  cases  where  the  constitutionality  of  Terms  of  Union  was 
questioned  (or  when  rights  outlined  in  Terms  conflicted  with  those  from  other  areas  of  the 




obligations  outlined  in  the  Terms,  or  vice  versa;  if  citizens  attempted  to  take  a  signatory 
province or the federal government to court based on their reneging on obligations; or finally, if 
a province attempted to renegotiate  their  respective Terms of Union  (especially  if  in doing so 








                                                 
42 Penney, 85. 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